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THE INDIANA DOCTRINE OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY
VICTOR E. ALDRIDGE JR.*
The overwhelming majority of the courts hold that in
considering the question of exemplary damages, it is im-
material that the wrong committed is also punishable as a
crime., Indiana is a member of the small minority that ad-
heres to the view that if the tort is also a crime, there can
be no recovery of punitive damages. 2 It is beyond the scope
of this paper to embark into the formidable accumulation
of material concerning the logic and policy mustered by the
opposing camps.3 Such a task would inevitably lad to text
book proportions. Rather, I shall confine the discussion to
a more or less detailed analysis of the problems that have
actually arisen.
The Indiana doctrine was born in Judge Davison's opin-
ion of Hudson v. Taber in 1854.4 Only the grmlins are
aware of the psychologic phenomena that tempted Judge
Davison to turn a deaf ear to the common law and the
mountain of majority authority to adopt for Indiana a view
* Lieutenant, AUS; of the Indiana bar.
1. Jackson v. Wells, 13 Texas Civ. App. 275 (1896), 33 S.W. 528;
Roach v. Caldbeck, 64 Vt. 593 (1892), 24 Atl. 98D; Bundy v.
Maginess, 76 Cal. 532 (1888), 18 Pac. 668; Brown v. Evans, 17
Fed. 912 (1883); Smith v. Bagwell, 19 Fla. 117 (1832), 45 Am.
Rep. 12; Boetcher v. Staples, 27 Minn. 308 (1880), 7 N.W. 263.
2. Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541 (1886); Cherry v. McCall, 23 Ga.
193 (1857).
3. 15 Am. Jur., Crim. Law s 259 et seq.
15 Am. Jur., Damages s 2 75 et seq.
17 C.J. s 278
8 R.C.L. 145 et seq.
4. 5 Ind. 322 (1854)
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that had previously been almost solely confined to text-
writer confabulation.5 This case involved a suit for assault
and battery and the plaintiff was seeking a favorable in-
struction on exemplary damages. Judge Davison said,
"There is a class of offences, the commission of which, in addi-
tion to the civil remedy allowed the injured party, subjects the
offender to a state prosecution. To this class the case under
consideration belongs; and if the principle of the instruction
be correct, Taber may be twice punished for the same assault
and battery. This would not accord with the spirit of our
institutions. The constitution declares, that, 'no person shall
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offence,' and though
that provision may not relate to the remedies secured by civil
proceedings, still it serves to illustrate a fundamental principle
inculcated by every well-regulated system of government, viz.,
that each violation of the law should be certainly followed by
one appropriate punishment and no more."
This statement is singular in two respects; first, Judge
Davison did not say that allowing exemplary damages would
be unconstitutional but only "not in accord with the spirit of
our constitution," and secondly, he did not believe it was
unconstitutional as witnessed by his words "and though that
provision may not relate to the remedies secured by civil pro-
ceeding." What he intended as a source of authority for
his decision yet remains a mystery.
There is another important aspect of this case that
might be called an "instrument of toleration" for the an-
nounced rule of damages. Compensatory damages were not
confined to the proof of actual physical injury, but the jury
was authorized to take into consideration every circumstance
of the act which injuriously affected the plaintiff; not only
his property, but his person, his peace of mind, in short, his
individual happiness. Throughout the history of Indiana de-
cisions, the courts have repentently off-set their decision on
exemplary damages by a similar consoling instruction.6 This
5. Willis, "Measure of Damages When Property is Wrongfully Taken
by a Private Individual" (1908) 22 Harv. L. Rev. 419; 1 Suther-
land Dam. 740 et seq.; Sedgwick on the Measure of Damages 465;
Hillard on Remedies for Torts; 12 Cent. L.J. 862; Wood, Nui-
sances 862.
6. Wolf v. Trinkle, 103 Ind. 355 (1885); State v. Stevens, 103 Ind.55 (1885); Stewart v. Maddox, 63 Ind. 51 (1878) where the
court held that the plaintiff was not restricted to mere pecuniary
injury but might be allowed damages for loss of time, delay
in business, expenses incurred; injury to business or profession,
reputation, and social position; for physical suffering as bodily
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author submits that the distinction between vindicative dam-
ages and "compensatory" damages of such a metaphysical
nature, is largely a matter of spelling as the award may be
as large in the latter case as if exemplary damages themselves
had been allowed.
From Hudson v. Taber, the Indiana courts have un-
bendingly taken the position that a court is unwarcranted in
allowing the recovery of exemplary damages where the
wrong is also a crime,7 and permitting them when the defend-
ant is not susceptible to criminal punishment for his wrong-
ful act.8 The great confusion has arisen over the power of
the legislature to provide for the allowance of exemplary
damages or penalties in civil suits., This problem will be
reserved and a brief reference to some of the other important
phases of the general doctrine will be considered first.
I
One of the most curious results of the doctrine arises
when a corporation is sued for an assault and battery com-
mitted by one of its agents.,, A corporation in Indiana can
pain, permanent disability, disfigurement; mental trouble as an-
guish of mind, sense of shame or humiliation, loss of honor; all
of which were considered compensatory and not examplary or
punitive damages. Nossaman v. Rickert, 18 Ind. 350 (1862);
Missison v. Hoch, 17 Ind. 164 (1861); Taber v. Hudson, 5 Ind.
322 (1854).
7. Nay v. Byers, 13 Ind. 412 (1859) (assault and batte.-y); Butler
v. Mercer, 14 Ind. 479 (1860) (malicious trespass); Nossaman v.
Rickert, 18 Ind. 350 (1862) (assault and battery); Humphries
v. Johnson, 20 Ind. 190 (1863) (malicious trespass); More v.
Cross, 43 Ind. 34 (1873) (malicious trespass); Kepler v. Hyer,
48 Ind. 500 (1874) (assault and battery); Stewart v. Maddox, 63
Ind. 51 (1878) (false imprisonment, denied or roux; Wolf v.
Trinkle, 103 Ind. 355 (1885) (assault and battery); Wabash
Printing & Pub. Co. v. Crumrine, 123 Ind. 89 (1889) (malicious
libel; Tracy v. Hacket, 39 Ind. App. 133 (1898) (malicious libel);
Borkenstein v. Schrack, 31 Ind. App. 220 (1903) (assault and
battery); Anderson v. Evansville Brewing Ass'n, 49 Ind. App.
403 (1912) (deceit but guilty of selling liquor to unlicensed re-
tailer); Skufakiss v. Duray, 85 Ind. App. 426 (1926) (malicious
trespass).
8. Guard v. Risk, 11 Ind. 156 (1858) (slander); Milliscn v. Hoch,
17 Ind. 227 (1861) (deceit); Sangater v. Prather, '4 Ind. 504
(1870) (deceit); Ziegler v. Powell, 54 Ind. 173 (1876) (malicious
prosecution).
9. McClellan, "Exemplary Damages in Indiana" (1935) 10 .Ind.
L.J. 275.
10. Indianapolis Bleaching Co. v. McMillan, 64 Ind. App. 268 (1916);
Baltimore, etc. R. Co. v. Davis, 44 Ind. App. 375 (1909); Louis-
ville N.A. & C. R. Co. v. Goben, 15 Ind. App. 123 (1895); Citizens
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not be prosecuted for a crime except when expressly so pro-
vided by statute.', This presents the anomalous situation of
compelling the innocent corporation to respond vicariously
with punitive damages because it is not subject to criminal
prosecution for assault and battery, but if the agent who
committed the tort is sued, he can shield himself from puni-
tive damages because he is susceptibe to criminal punishment.
The practical result is that the innocent corporation is
chastised and the culpable agent is protected. In one In-
diana case,12 there is language to the effect that a corporation
is liable for exemplary damages only whenever the agent may
be. In view of the above, it is submitted that such a statement
is technically inaccurate.
The case of Ziegler v. Powell113 involved a suit for ma-
licious prosecution. The defendant had charged the plaintiff
with stealing and the plaintiff had been acquitted upon a
hearing before a justice of the peace. The plaintiff asked
for an instruction for exemplary damages and the defendant
objected contending he was liable to a criminal prosecution
under a statute defining misdemeanors which provided "If
any person shall maliciously, without probable cause, attempt
to cause an indictment to be found, or other prosecution, for
any crime or misdemeanor, to be commenced against any
person, the person being innocent, such person so offending
shall be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars, etc." The
court allowed the instruction for exemplary damages holding
that the defendant was not liable to prosecution under the
statute as it applied to an attempt to cause an indictment to
be found, or a prosecution to be commenced, not a con-
summated prosecution! This case seems to be the first of a
series of warped constructions fostered by the court in an
endeavor to escape the application of the rule. True, the rule
escaped even a qualification, but the court arrived at an
amazing result to allow punitive damages and still retain the
sanctity of the Taber case. To say that the defendant was
subject to a criminal prosecution at one stage of his action
Steel R. Co. v. Willoeby, 134 Ind. 563 (1893); Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Bierhaus, 8 Ind. App. 563 (1893); Louisville N.A. & C.
R. Co. v. Wolf, 128 Ind. 89 (1867).
11. State v. Sullivan Co. Ag. Soc., 14 Ind. App. 369 (1895); State v.
President, 23 Ind. 362 (1864).
12. State v. Stevens, 103 Ind. 55 (1885).
13. 54 Ind. 173 (1876).
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but successfully freed himself from it by continuing to pursue
his prosecution to a decision seems not only contrary to legal
principles but a bit absurd. The court was clearly dissatisfied
if not indifferent to the prevailing law.
This suggests another quandary created by the Indiana
rule. That is the necessity of construing criminal statutes in
civil cases. Suppose that a court in a civil case decides that
the defendant cannot be held for exemplary damages because
he is subject to a criminal prosecution for the same act. If
any force at all is to be attributed to this determination, it
must be a legal conclusion of the defendant's guilt of a crime.
Logically then, an introduction of this determination should
be conclusive against the defendant in a subsequent criminal
prosecution. Of course, even a correspondence school lawyer
would feel like a commando when he heard this proposition
and a whole massive wall of criminal theory wouk. engulf it,
but the problem would still remain unsolved. Suppose again,
that after a civil determination of the defendant's innocence
of crime, exemplary damages are assessed against him. There-
after, a criminal prosecution results in his conviction. Could
the defendant then appeal his civil case? If the determination
of the civil case had been handed down by the Supi eme Court
and the time for petition for rehearing had lapsed, it would
seem that the defendant would have no recourse for having
been twice placed in jeopardy. Query, whether the defend-
ant might succeed in recovering the amount of punitive dam-
ages paid in the civil suit by an action in the natuae of quasi-
contract. But this seems open to attack by the intricacies of
res adjudicata. One can only speculate on an answer to this
vicious circle. The courts have thus far enjoyed the tran-
quillity of not being faced squarely with this anomalous con-
coction.
The case of Farman v. Laivman 4 presents the delicacy
of a strictly formalistic aspect of the Indiana rule. Here, the
action was for assault and battery and false imprisonment.
The court allowed punitive damages for the false imprison-
ment but refused to allow them for the paragraph charging
assault and battery, saying that the defendant was liable for
criminal prosecution for the latter. This case suggests the
benefits that may reward a refined consideration of possible
theories of the case. Apparently selecting a theory, the ele-
14. 73 Ind. 568 (1881).
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ments of which, combined with the necessary state of mind
for exemplary damages, would not constitute a crime, would
be a successful devise for evading the rule against exemplary
damages.
II
The most volatile field of litigation has been the con-
troversy over the power of the legislature to provide for pun-
ishment of a wrongdoer in a civil action when the wrongdoer
may also be subject to criminal prosecution. In order to pro-
mote clarity and continuity of thought as much as possible, an
effort will be made to follow the decisions chronologically.
It must be borne in mind that the original Indiana de-
cision of Taber v. Hudson15 did not expressly hold that allow-
ing vindicative damages in a civil suit when the wrongdoer
was also susceptible of criminal punishment for the act, was
unconstitutional. The court had offered only the inadequate
expression that such was "not in accord with the spirit of
our constitution." In 1858, the case of Struble v. Nodwift 0
involving a legislative civil action for exemplary damages
against a criminally responsible defendant, reached the Su-
preme Court but the question of legislative power was neglect-
ed and this highly inflammable issue remained smoldering
in the judicial pot until almost a score of years later. Then
at about the same time, two cases, Koerner v. Oberly17 and
Schafer v. Smith 8 were filed with the Supreme Court. Both
involved the question of exemplary damages under a liquor
statute of 1873 which gave a civil action and authorized
exemplary damages in favor of a wife against anyone selling
liquor to her habitually inebriated spouse, and also made it
a misdemeanor. An opinion for the Schafer case was first
handed down by Judge Howk on March 6, 1877 upholding
the constitutionality of the statute and allowing the plaintiff
to recover exemplary damages. Judge Howk said, "We recog-
nize the rule, which ordinarily prevails, that where a given
act is or may be the subject of a criminal prosecution, and
also of a civil action for damages in favor of the party there-
by injured, exemplary damages will not be allowed in such
15. 5 Ind. 322 (1854).
16. 11 Ind. 64 (1858).
17. 56 Ind. 284 (1877).
18. 63 Ind. 226 (1878).
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action. This rule, however, like most of the rules of civil prac-
tice, is a proper subject of legislative action, and the General
Assembly may well provide in such a case as the ,ase at bar
that the injured party may recover, not only actual damages,
but also exemplary damages, and the courts of the State will
be bound to carry out and enforce such provision. In con-
sidering this subject, appellant's counsel seem to confound
the terms 'fine' and 'exemplary damages,' and to regard the
one the synonym of the other; but there is a marked and well
defined difference between the meaning of these terms. A
fine is an amercement imposed upon a person for a past
violation of law; but exemplary damages have reference
rather to the future than the past conduct of the offender,
and are not given as a compensation to the injured party, but
as an admonition to the offender not to repeat the offense."
In arriving at this conclusion the court completely lost
sight of the origin and basis of the Indiana rule which seem-
ingly was one of constitutionality and double jeopardy and
instead, relegating it to one of procedure or "a rule of civil
practice" which of course, would make it a subject of legisla-
tive action. By resolving the basis of the Indiana rule to be
one of procedure in order to save the statute, the court not
only. abandoned the basis upon which the rule against ex-
emplary damages was originally predicated, but forced a ra-
tionalization of all previous cases where exemplary damages
were denied, that was totally foreign to common law con-
cepts. The common law had never known a rule of procedure
which barred recovery of exemplary damages when the de-
fendant was subject to criminal prosecution. How our courts
could authoritatively support such a rule without legislative
sanction is hard to conceive. The constitutional argument must
be maintained or logically the whole formidable array of de-
cisions since Taber v. Hudson which denied exemplary dam-
ages must fall. Judge Howk's distinction between a fine and
exemplary damages is not worthy of quibble.
On April 13, 1877, petition for rehearing was filed and
granted four days later.o Consequently, the opinion of Judge
Howk was never published in the Indiana Reports. In the
May term of 1877, the sister case of Koerner v. Oberly was
decided exactly opposite to the opinion and holding in
Schafer v. Smith. Judge Worden held the provision of the
19. Personal correspondence with Richman, C.J. June 22, 1943.
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statute allowing exemplary damages violated the fundamental
principle embodied in the Bill of Rights, that no person shall
be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense and that it was
inoperative and void. It was distinctly ruled that the legisla-
ture was prohibited by the constitution from authorizing the
infliction of exemplary damages for a wrong which was also
punishable as a crime. This was a direct ruling on legislative
power and the decision returned the rule to the only solid
basis it had ever had.
The opinion of the Schafer case becomes even more
singular in view of the fact that only a matter of days after
it was handed down without dissent, the same tribunal should
come to the diametrically opposite conclusion without even
the dissent of Judge Howk himself. Thereafter, on Novem-
ber 25, 1878, a second opinion was handed down by Judge
Niblack for the Schafer case20 which completely disposed of
the case by saying, "The question of exemplary damages has
been fully discussed and ruled upon by this court in the case
of Koerner v. Oberly."
The havoc wrought by the first opinion of the Schafer
case was not confined to Indiana. That opinion fell into the
eager hands of the Central Law Journal and was published
in 4 Central Law Journal 271. In 1883, a case was before
the Supreme Court of Kansas in volving the question of ex-
emplary damages in a liquor statute almost identical with
the one in Indiana.21 The Kansas court quoting the first
opinion of Schafer v. Smith from the Central Law Journal,
said, "The law in Indiana was now that the legislature had
power to give a civil action authorizing exemplary damages
even when the defendant was subject to a criminal prosecu-
tion for the same act," and used this as the substantial basis
of their decision upholding the constitutionality of the statute
without taking the pains to look into the Indiana Reports
where they would have found that opinion had been with-
drawn and superceded five years previously. As in the words
of the great Lord Coleridge, "this I believe, no one has ever
followed." 22
With the final decisions of the Koerner and Schafer
cases safely bound in the Indiana Reports, apparently the
20. 63 Ind. 226 (1878).
21. Jockers v. Borgman, 29 Kan. 109 (1883).
22. Bowen v. Hall, L.R. 6 Q.B. 333 (1880-81).
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battle had been fought and the issue decided. Such was not
the case, and a few years later the court re-orened rusty
doors and again brought out the issue of legislative power.
This time, it was to work its greatest absurdities and cruci-
fixion of legal concepts. The case of State v. Ste-,ens23 came
before the Supreme Court in 1885. This was an action against
a former clerk of circuit court to recover illegal fees collected.
Section 6031, R.S. 1881 provided, "Any officer who shall
charge, demand or take any unauthorized fee for the per-
formance of any official act, shall, in addition to being deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, be liable to the party injured for
five times the illegal fees charged, demanded, or taken." The
culpable officer contended that the statute was unconstitu-
tional and aptly quoted the Koerner and Schafer cases. The
statute made the act a crime and also allowed a civil suit for
five times the plaintiff's damage. Plainly, this was a civil
punishment prescribed by the legislature. The only variation
between the statute involved in the Koerner and Schafer
cases and the present statute was that here, the legislature
had prescribed the amount of exemplary damages instead of
authorizing a jury to find them. The Koerner and Schafer
cases would seem to have been decisive precedent. The opin-
ion of Judge Mitchell indicated that his thought on the prob-
lem was unusually clear and learned. He said, "f the pro-
vision that 'no one shall be put in jeopardy twice for the
same offense' is, as the court has recognized it to be, a sure
protection against the power of the courts in that regard,
it must be deemed equally potential against the power of the
legislature. It cannot be maintained in reason that it shall
be interpreted to mean that the courts can not adjudge a
second punishment for the same offense except when ex-
pressly authorized by the legislature, for the reason that in
so far as the legislature attempts to authorize such second
punishment, the barrier of the constitution is as effectual
against it as it is against the court."
This was a profound answer to the challenge of legis-
lative power and if the statute had been thereafter adjudged
unconstitutional, the issue of legislative power would have
ben dead and the law in. Indiana would have undoubtedly
been on solid footing thenceforth. The court, however, held
the statute valid on the grounds that there was no element
23. 103 Ind. 55 (1885).
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of exemplary damages but only a fixed amount for the civil
liability of the officer as a measure of compensation for the
injury. This was plainly inconsistent and was disappointing
after the precise dicta of Judge Mitchell. Even the elasticity
of definition could never permit of damages to the extent
of five times the actual damage suffered being deemed com-
pensatory. The legislature had plainly provided for puni-
tive damages to be inflicted upon a violator of the statute and
whether the exact amount was prescribed by the legislature
or left to the discretion of a jury, there would be absolutely
no difference in principle. In addition, Judge Mitchell, in
his desire to uphold the constitutionality of the statute, gave
vent to a statement which if accepted, would undermine the
whole basis of the Indiana doctrine. He said, "Even regard-
ing the whole statute as penal, it can not be said that the
person offending has been put in jeopardy of the penalties
prescribed until he has been tried for the misdemeanor and
has also answered for the penalty fixed to the injured party
as his compensation." In no Indiana case had the issue been
whether the defendant could be civilly punished after he had
been criminally convicted for the same act. The decisions
had always been on a basis that the defendant might be crim-
inally prosecuted and this was deemed sufficient to defeat
exemplary damages. If one accepted the premise of Judge
Mitchell's statement, no statute allowing punitive damages
would be unconstitutional for that reason. The situation
then would be that one could either be criminally prosecuted
or sued civilly for exemplary damages, but once he had suf-
fered one, he could plead it to defeat a subsequent criminal
prosecution or exemplary damages in a civil suit. However,
there would be no question of the legislature's power.
Judge Elliott felt compelled to dissent from Judge Mitch-
ell's conception of compensatory damages but concurred in
the decision. Judge Elliott wheeled out the old legislative
power argument used in the withdrawn opinion of Judge
Howk in the Schafer case, maintaining that the legislature
had the power to provide for punitive damages in cases where
an injury is caused by an illegal act, although the illegal act
may subject the defendant to a criminal prosecution and the
legislature has authority either to limit the amount to be
recovered or to leave it to be ascertained by a jury. Judge
Elliott saw that whether the legislature or the jury fixed
[Vol. 20
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the punitive damages was a distinction without a difference
as far as the constitutionality of the statute wa concerned.
It is unfortunate that he adhered to the legislative power
theory. Thus, the case of State v. Stevens not only limited
and confused the clear doctrine of the Oberley and Schafer
cases, but brought out again the "die-hard" legislative power
theory in Judge Elliott's dissenting opinion.
In 1893, the case of State v. Schoonover 24 reached the
Supreme Court. This case involved a suit under a stautute
which gave a party bribed to vote in a certain manner, a
civil action for $300 against the bribing party, which bribing
party was also subject to a criminal prosecution, The stat-
ute could have been upheld under the double jeopardy theory
without an injustice to the rule as the amount of damages
prescribed could have passed for a legislative estimate of
the actual damage suffered by the plaintiff for the peculiar
type of injury. However, Judge Dailey saw fit to indorse
as the basis of his decision, the dissenting opinion of Judge
Elliott in State v. Stevens. This case is rather disheartening.
Previously, the illogical legislative power theory had been
utilized only as a last resort to uphold legislation. Here, the
theory had been adopted when such was unnecessary. Thus,
the Supreme Court had finally decided squarely in favor of
the power of the legislature to prescribe both criminal and
civil punishment for the same act.
One other case worthy of mention was decided in the
Supreme Court in 1900. This case, State v. Latshaw,25 in-
volved the validity of the fraudulent marriages act. This
act provided that if a man, subject to criminal prosecution
for seduction or bastardy, entered into a marriage fraudu-
lently to escape punishment and then subsequently abandoned
his wife, the wife might sue for a penalty (it was called a
penalty in the act) of not less than $200. The defense con-
tended that such might result in double jeopardy. This con-
tention was, however, disapproved by the court, it holding
that the provision for damages were compensatory and not
punitive. The court did not hold, as in the Schoonover case,
that the legislature had power to provide a civil action au-
thorizing punitive damages for an act which was also sub-
ject to a criminal prosecution. Judge Jordan merely said,
24. 135 Ind. 532 (1893).
25. 156 Ind. 194 (1900).
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"The legislature may provide for the recovery of damages
in a civil action where the injury is caused by an illegal act,
although the same act may subject the defendant to a crim-
inal prosecution." There is no argument with this decision
as it is conceded that the legislature can provide for damages
in a civil action when the malfactor is subject to criminal
prosecution as long as it does not attempt to provide for
punitive damages. In view of the fact that Judge Jordon
chose also to call the provision for damages compensatory
and not penal, it seems that he was attempting to place his
decision within the confines of the double jeopardy theory
which had been abandoned in the Schoonover case. Indeed,
the provision for damages might justifiably be considered
as merely compensatory with a minimum limitation as to the
amount the court or jury could find. The case can be square-
ly reconciled with the decisions in the Koerner and Schafer
cases and the dicta by Judge Mitchell in the Steven's case,
as an authority in favor of the double jeopardy theory al-
though at first blush the opinion seems to support the legis-
lative power theory.
Finally, it might be doubted that there was even a
question of double punishment involved in the case. The
defendant had married the plaintiff to escape criminal prose-
cution and at present had abandoned her but was still legally
married. In State v. Otis26 it was held that where the female
seduced, subsequently marries her seducer, that during the
continuance of such marriage, he cannot be successfully
prosecuted upon the charge of criminal seduction. If this
be true, the defendant was not subject to a criminal prosecu-
tion because although he had abandoned the plaintiff, giving
rise to the civil cause of action, yet he legally remained her
husband and could not be criminally prosecuted. Under
these circumstances there would be no question of the legis-
lature's power even as to making the civil action punitive in
character.
III
As stated at the beginning, it has not been the purpose
here to evalue the Indiana rule of exemplary damages. Suf-
ficient to say, it is contrary to the common law and the over-
whelming majority of authority. Yet, in the multitude of
26. 135 Ind. 267 (1893).
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Indiana cases there is no suggestion of abandonmrent of the
doctrine. Thus, conceding the principle to be permanent,
the legal basis should be closely examined and placed on a
solid, logical foundation. That foundation Mlust be the dou-
ble jeopardy clause in the constitution of Indiana.
It is recalled that the original Indiana case of Taber v.
Hudson27 declared that allowing exemplary damages would
"not accord with the spirit of our institutions," but did not
expressly declare that such would be double jeopardy and
unconstitutional. As the common law would have allowed
the damages and the legislature was silent, the only authority
for such a conclusion must have really been unconstitutional-
ity. Then the withdrawn opinion of Judge Howk in Schafer
v. Smith attempted to allow the legislature to provide for
exemplary damages by contending that the question was
merely one of legislative power and not double jeopardy. This
opinion was withdrawn and soon after, the case of Koerner
v. Oberly28 held that it was as much double jeopardy and
unconstitutional for the legislature to allow exemplary dam-
ages against a person susceptible of criminal punishment as
it was for the courts to do so. The final opinion of the
Schafer case followed the Koerner case. 29 State v. Stevens30
adhered to the constitutional theory of the Koerner and
Schafer cases but allowed the statute to stand by calling the
prescribed damages compensatory instead of punitive as they
undoubtedly were. It was in the Stevens case that Judge
Elliott also gave his dissenting opinion, returning to the
theory used in Judge Howk's withdrawn opinion and con-
tending that the question was one of legislative power and
not constitutionality. The case of State v. Schoonover 3l need-
lessly utilized the legislative power theory by indor3ing Judge
Elliott's dissenting opinion in the Stevens case. The statute
involved could have probably been upheld under the con-
stitutional theory. Finally, the case of State v. Latshaw32
upon close analysis, seemed to adhere to the constitutional
theory and although the statute involved was upheld, it seems
27. 5 Ind. 322 (1854).
28. 56 Ind. 284 (1877).
29. 63 Ind. 226 (1878).
30. 103 Ind. 55 (1885).
31. 135 Ind. 532 (1893).
32. 156 Ind. 194 (1900).
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that Judge Jordon was attempting to reconcile it with the
constitutional theory by calling the damages merely compen-
satory, and as previously stated, this was probably justified.
The courts have unbrokenly denied exemplary damages
when the defendant is subject to a criminal prosecution for
the same act.
As the common law allowed such damages to be assessed,
the basis of these cases necessarily must be one of consti-
tutionality and double jeopardy.
This constitutional limitation must apply to the legisla-
ture as well as the courts.33
Only one decision 34 squarely decides in favor of the leg-
islative power theory. All the remaining cases have on close
analysis, either expressly or impliedly adhered to the consti-
tutional theory that the legislature has no power to authorize
punitive damages when the defendant is also susceptible to
criminal prosecution for the same act.
33. McClellan in his article "Exemplary Damages in Indiana" 10
Ind. L.J. 275 (1935), believes the legislature has this power but
he offers no supporting argument.
34. State v. Schoonover, 135 Ind. 532 (1893).
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